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This article analyzes the topic of leadership from an evo-
lutionary perspective and proposes three conclusions that
are not part of mainstream theory. First, leading and
following are strategies that evolved for solving social
coordination problems in ancestral environments, includ-
ing in particular the problems of group movement, intra-
group peacekeeping, and intergroup competition. Second,
the relationship between leaders and followers is inher-
ently ambivalent because of the potential for exploitation of
followers by leaders. Third, modern organizational struc-
tures are sometimes inconsistent with aspects of our
evolved leadership psychology, which might explain the
alienation and frustration of many citizens and employees.
The authors draw several implications of this evolutionary
analysis for leadership theory, research, and practice.
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W
hy is leadership important? During times of
peace and prosperity, it seems not to matter.
However, when politicians start wars, when
business leaders gamble with our life savings, and when
religious leaders create violent sectarian divides, leadership
becomes a matter of life and death.
We know a lot about leadership (Bass, 1990; House &
Aditya, 1997; Yukl, 2006). It is a universal feature of
human societies and affects the quality of life of citizens in
important ways (Brown, 1991; R. Hogan, Curphy, &
Hogan, 1994). When people are placed in ad hoc laboratory
groups, leader–follower structures quickly emerge (Bales,
1951; Mann, 1959; Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999). Hu-
mans easily recognize leadership potential in others (Lord,
DeVader, & Alliger, 1986). People also romanticize lead-
ership; we often attribute great importance to leaders even
when it is not warranted (Hackman & Wageman, 2007;
Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985). Leadership is an un-
avoidable theme in society and arguably the most important
problem in the social sciences.
Although the leadership literature is enormous, it
lacks an integrative theoretical framework that can make
sense of the richness of the data (Chemers, 2000; R. Hogan
& Kaiser, 2005). There are several reasons for this. First,
the literature contains many useful mid-level theories that
are not very well connected (Bass, 1990; Yukl, 2006).
Second, the literature focuses on leaders and tends to
ignore the essential role of followers (Hollander, 1992;
Yukl, 2006). Third, research largely concentrates on prox-
imate issues of leadership (e.g., What makes one person a
better leader than others?) and rarely considers its ultimate
functions (e.g., How did leadership promote survival and
reproductive success among our ancestors?) (R. Hogan &
Kaiser, 2005). Finally, there has been little cross-fertiliza-
tion between psychology and disciplines such as anthro-
pology, economics, neuroscience, biology, and zoology,
which also contain important insights about leadership
(Bennis, 2007; Van Vugt, 2006).
This article offers a view of leadership inspired by
evolutionary theory, which modern scholars increasingly
see as essential for understanding social life (Buss, 2005;
Lawrence & Nohria, 2002; McAdams & Pals, 2006; Nettle,
2006; Schaller, Simpson, & Kenrick, 2006). We argue ﬁrst
that an evolutionary approach to leadership raises some
important new questions. Next we analyze the implications
of leader–follower relations in early human and nonhuman
societies for theories of leadership. We use (evolutionary)
game theory to model the emergence of leadership; this
model is followed by a hypothetical account of how lead-
ership developed over four stages of evolutionary history.
We conclude with some novel implications of this analysis
for leadership theory, research, and practice.
An Evolutionary Analysis of
Leadership
Researchers deﬁne leadership in many ways (Stogdill,
1974). We deﬁne it broadly in terms of (a) inﬂuencing
individuals to contribute to group goals and (b) coordinat-
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1992; Yukl, 2006). We think pragmatically of leadership as
building a team and guiding it to victory (R. Hogan et al.,
1994). Leadership is both a resource for groups and an
attribute of individuals, but we believe that its primary
signiﬁcance concerns group performance (R. Hogan &
Kaiser, 2005; Kaiser, Hogan, & Craig, 2008). Given the
ﬁtness and reproductive beneﬁts associated with social
status (Betzig, 1993; Buss, 2005; Chagnon, 1997), the
“selﬁsh-gene” view of evolution (Dawkins, 1976) suggests
that everyone should strive to become a leader. From this
same perspective it is not obvious why some would vol-
untarily subordinate themselves. Researchers rarely con-
sider the origins of followership, but the topic is central to
an evolutionary analysis.
Although Sigmund Freud, William James, William
McDougall, and E. L. Thorndike were enthusiastic Dar-
winians, evolutionary thinking fell out of favor in main-
stream psychology for most of the 20th century (Pinker,
2002). It is now returning in the form of evolutionary
psychology. Evolutionary psychology proposes that the
mind is composed of mechanisms, called psychological
adaptations, that were favored by natural selection because
they solved adaptive problems faced by our ancestors.
Examples of such mechanisms include mating strategies,
cheater detection, status sensitivity, and language (Barkow,
Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Buss, 2005; Schaller et al.,
2006; cf. Darwin, 1871).
Evolutionary psychologists use Tinbergen’s (1963)
four functions model to analyze psychological adapta-
tions. This framework ﬁrst asks about the proximate
functions of a mechanism. For leadership we can ask
what kind of people make good leaders, a question that
interests social, industrial/organizational, and applied
psychologists. The second question concerns ontogene-
sis: When do leader–follower patterns emerge in the life
span? Does developmental history predict leadership
propensity? Developmental, personality, and educational
psychologists are interested in these issues. The third
question concerns phylogenesis: When did leadership
emerge in our species, and are there parallels in other
species? This question concerns comparative psycholo-
gists, anthropologists, and zoologists. Finally, there is
the question of the ultimate (evolutionary) functions of a
mechanism, a question that interests evolutionary psy-
chologists and biologists: Did leadership promote the
survival of our forebearers so that it became part of our
evolved psychology?
Each of Tinbergen’s (1963) functions analyzes lead-
ership from a different perspective and should be kept
distinct. For instance, functional theories assume that lead-
ership involves identifying obstacles between groups and
their goals and then ﬁnding ways to overcome those ob-
stacles (Hackman & Walton, 1986; Lord, 1977). These
theories offer proximate explanations for why particular
leaders are effective in particular circumstances. They can
be complemented with an analysis of the functions of
leadership in ancestral environments, which may explain
why and how the role of leadership evolved in the ﬁrst
place.
Human Evolution, Group Life, and
Leadership
Humans evolved as group-living animals (Baumeister &
Leary, 1995; D. T. Campbell, 1975; Darwin, 1871). The
genus Homo is estimated to be about 2.5 million years old,
and for most of their existence, hominids lived in small,
kin-based bands on the African savannah, adopting a no-
madic hunter-gatherer lifestyle. Group living allowed our
ancestors to cope with an environment well supplied with
predators but poorly supplied with shelter, water, and food
(Foley, 1997; E. O. Wilson, 1975). Collective foraging and
hunting, food sharing, division of labor, group defenses,
and communal parenting provided a buffer against external
threats (Kenrick, Li, & Butner, 2003). The need for collec-
tive action raises the question of how individuals in social
groups decide what to do and how and when to do it. For
example, ﬁnding food would require group members to
decide on the location and timing of foraging activities
(Couzin, Krause, Franks, & Levin, 2005). Such problems
can be solved by a decision-making process in which one
individual takes the initiative and provides direction while
others acquiesce and follow that direction.
Individual and group survival would also have de-
pended on cooperative effort and group cohesion (Bloom,
2000; Darwin, 1871; Sober & Wilson, 1998), which are
inversely related to group size (Dunbar, 2004; Ingham,
Levinger, Graves, & Peckham, 1974). Anthropological ev-
idence suggests that life in ancestral groups involved con-
stant conﬂict, and homicide was common (Chagnon, 1997;
Knauft, 1987; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). The need for
peacekeeping created a niche for individuals who, with the
support of the group, intervened in conﬂicts before they
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1996).
Conﬂict and warfare between groups was a major
force in human evolutionary history (Alexander, 1987;
Bloom, 1997; Chagnon, 1997; Diamond, 1997; Keeley,
1996; Van Vugt, De Cremer, & Janssen, 2007; Wade,
2006; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). Intergroup competi-
tion may have created pressures for the evolution of a range
of groupish traits such as altruism (Axelrod, 1984), empa-
thy (Preston & de Waal, 2002), morality (de Waal, 1996;
Haidt, 2007), social identity (D. T. Campbell, 1965), and
perhaps leadership. Darwin (1871, p. 132) noted, “A tribe
including many members who . . . were always ready to aid
one another, and to sacriﬁce themselves for the common
good, would be victorious over most other tribes, and this
would be natural selection.” Deferring to a central com-
mand enhances group performance during intergroup con-
ﬂict (Keegan, 1994; Sherif, 1966), creating a role for lead-
ership.
Thus, leadership probably has a long evolutionary
history. It may have emerged as a solution to speciﬁc group
coordination challenges—group movement, intragroup
conﬂict, and intergroup competition are prime candidates.
Arguably, individual ﬁtness would be enhanced by living
in groups with effective leadership. As a test of Darwin’s
(1871) observation, imagine two groups of early humans
living in the same region and competing for the same
resources. One group is characterized by poor group deci-
sion making and internal discord. The second is character-
ized by efﬁcient group decision making and internal cohe-
sion. Over time, the second group will prevail. In this way,
psychological mechanisms supporting leadership and fol-
lowership could eventually spread through a population.
Adaptations Supporting Leadership and
Followership
A computational analysis of the coordination problem pro-
vides clues to the cognitive processes needed to support
leadership (cf. Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Pinker, 2002).
The simple decision rule “follow the leader” can be broken
down into several components. First, individuals must per-
ceive the need for coordination. In emergencies, people
coordinate spontaneously (Argote, 1982), which suggests
that humans may have specialized mechanisms for identi-
fying situations requiring coordination. Second, situations
in which threats are not obvious (e.g., a slow decline of
resources) or are novel (e.g., climate change) require mech-
anisms that allow people to plan ahead and anticipate new
dangers, which suggests a role for general intelligence
(Kanazawa, 2004). Third, individuals must decide on a
collective course of action—for instance, whether to attack
another group—and differing opinions offer a prominent
role for leadership. Various specialized decision rules (ma-
jority rules, voting procedures, conformity, and minority
inﬂuence) might have emerged to support this aspect of
leadership.
Fourth, once a course of action is identiﬁed, it is
important to initiate group action. This is facilitated by
individual differences in temperament—assertiveness and
proactivity on the one hand, and patience, self-control, and
acquiescence on the other hand—which ensure that not
everyone is likely to make a ﬁrst move (Ames & Flynn,
2007; Couzin et al., 2005; Nettle, 2006). A related problem
involves identifying individuals worth following because
they have the requisite competence and expertise. The
solution to this problem requires mechanisms for recogniz-
ing leadership potential, which humans possess in abun-
dance (Littlepage, Robinson, & Reddington, 1997; Lord,
Foti, & DeVader, 1984).
Finally, the problem of maintaining cohesion in
large, dispersed groups could be solved by specialized
mechanisms for communication, perspective taking, and
conﬂict management. Speciﬁc abilities such as theory of
mind, empathy, social identity, and language may have
played a role in maintaining group cohesion (de Waal,
1996; Haidt, 2006, 2007; Van Vugt & Schaller, 2008).
Also, the capacity for imitation and social learning along
with mechanisms that direct attention to higher status
individuals would prompt followers to emulate leaders,
thereby adding to group identiﬁcation and cohesion
(Chance, 1967; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Punish-
ment of free riders (individuals who beneﬁt from group
living without contributing to it) and rule enforcement
provide alternative means for maintaining cohesion and
are also crucial leadership functions (De Cremer & Van
Vugt, 2002).
Thus, specialized mechanisms for planning, commu-
nication, group decision making, competence recognition,
social learning, and conﬂict management would have con-
tributed to the emergence of a speciﬁc leadership and
followership psychology in humans. It remains to be seen
whether these evolved mechanisms were speciﬁcally de-
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co-opted for these purposes (cf. Buss, Haselton, Shackel-
ford, Bleske, & Wakeﬁeld, 1998).
Game Theory Analysis of Leadership
Game theory was devised during World War II to ana-
lyze strategic interactions among combatants; it has sub-
sequently become an important method for studying
social processes (Gintis, 2007). Evolutionary psycholo-
gists use game theory to model social behaviors such as
altruism, conformity, and social intelligence (Axelrod,
1984; Schmitt & Pilcher, 2004; D. S. Wilson, Near, &
Miller, 1996). Leadership and followership can also be
modeled, and framing them in terms of game theory does
three things. First it suggests the way leadership and
followership may have evolved. Second, it requires re-
searchers to consider the perspectives of leaders and
followers simultaneously, clarifying the costs and ben-
eﬁts for each. Third, it suggests how individuals whose
interests potentially conﬂict might work together to
maximize mutual beneﬁts.
Evolutionary game theory (Maynard-Smith, 1982)
views social interaction as a process in which strategies
compete in a Darwinian fashion. In these games, the agents
embody strategies that are encoded in genes and, over the
course of evolution, are tested against alternative strategies
and copies of themselves. Genes spread through a popula-
tion depending on the relative superiority of their associ-
ated strategies in evolutionarily relevant situations. By re-
garding leadership and followership as alternative game
strategies, we may be able to tell how well these strategies
fare in competition with each other as well as with alter-
native strategies.
The Leader Game
The game of leader (Van Vugt & Kurzban, 2007) can be
used to model the leader–follower coordination problem.
Table 1 depicts one version of this game, which can be
illustrated using an example from our ancestral environ-
ment. Note that although we use the simplest case—a
dyadic game—the analysis can be easily extended to a
coalition of actors or to multiple coalitions (Maynard-
Smith, 1982). Also note that the payoffs represent units of
reproductive success (the currency in evolution). Further,
the absolute value of these points matters less than the
ranking of preferences across the four game cells.
Suppose Pat and Jamie are both dehydrated and that
Waterholes A and B contain water. Whichever waterhole
they choose, they must travel together for protection. How-
ever, Pat prefers Waterhole A—perhaps because he or she
knows how to get there—and this advantage gives him or
her an outcome of 3. Jamie prefers Waterhole B—it is
closer to his or her family—and this advantage gives him or
her an outcome of 3. The payoffs are such that both Pat
and Jamie are better off going to the same waterhole, yet
this gives one of them a relative advantage (2). The
asymmetrical payoffs in the leader game make it attractive
for players to take the lead. By coordinating on their
preferred hole, the leader gets a relatively better payoff
than the follower, which may ultimately be paid out in
greater reproductive success. Note that this game repre-
sents any social coordination problem—for example,
where to hunt, whether to ﬁght or take a nap.
The coordinating cells (A, A or B, B; see Table 1) are
the equilibrium points of the game, an important concept in
game theory (Gintis, 2007). Natural selection will favor
adaptations that lead to equilibrium—where neither party
can obtain better payoffs by switching strategies—and this
is relevant to the emergence of leadership and followership
because leadership can lead to equilibrium. If people play
the game simultaneously, most pairs fail to coordinate
because each will opt for the leader role (Van Vugt &
Kurzban, 2007). However, if they play the game sequen-
tially and one person takes the lead by moving ﬁrst or
indicating a preference (e.g., for Waterhole A), then most
Table 1
The Leader Game
Jamie
Pat
Waterhole A Waterhole B
Waterhole A 3, 1
* 0, 0
Waterhole B 0, 0 1, 3
*
Note. Payoffs are for Pat and Jamie, respectively; Waterhole A and Water-
hole B represent alternative game strategies (underpinned by gene alleles).
Game equilibria are indicated with asterisks.
Robert B.
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1 This analysis suggests that in species that
frequently encounter coordination problems, adaptations
for leadership and followership are likely to emerge. In
ancestral humans, these adaptations would have been sup-
ported by an increasingly sophisticated cognitive infra-
structure involving theory of mind, language, and culture,
with implications for the scale, complexity, and style of
leadership.
Note that this model makes no assumptions about the
design features of leadership and followership adaptations.
For instance, leader and follower roles may be adopted
ﬂexibly by the same individual because in some cases it
pays to be a leader and in others to be a follower. This is
consistent with a conditional strategies model (West-Eber-
hard, 2003), which assumes that organisms adopt strategies
based on speciﬁc environmental and/or developmental in-
puts (see also Gangestad & Simpson, 2000, on strategic
pluralism)—for instance, being the ﬁrstborn in the family
or the tallest in the class might dispose people to assume
leadership roles in later life (Simonton, 1994). On the other
hand, natural selection may have coded leader and follower
strategies in a more static fashion, so that populations
reached equilibrium using strategies maintained through
frequency-dependent selection (Maynard-Smith, 1982;
D. S. Wilson et al., 1996). Such models suggest that pop-
ulations contain individuals with genotypes predisposing
them to either leadership or followership.
2 As with sex
ratios, an increase in the frequency of leader genotypes in
a population reduces the payoffs for this strategy—because
many would-be leaders compete and fail to coordinate—
thus selecting against leader genotypes. The distinction
between conditional versus pure strategies is analogous to
the distinction between situational versus trait theories of
leadership (Van Vugt, 2006).
The Riddle of Following
An important implication of the leader game concerns the
origins of followership. Coordinated action serves the in-
terests of both leaders and followers, but the payoffs for
leaders are relatively better because they get beneﬁts when
others adopt their goals (e.g., status and prestige; Buss,
2005; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Because natural selec-
tion is based on relative (rather than absolute) ﬁtness, this
seems to make followership puzzling. Perhaps followers
simply make the best of a bad situation when they cannot
be leaders themselves (Dawkins, 1976). The mind may be
designed to evaluate one’s relative place in a hierarchy and
to evaluate the costs and beneﬁts of competing for higher
status. Such a mechanism is implicit in the pecking order
phenomenon, ﬁrst observed in chickens (Schjelderup-
Ebbe, 1935), which promotes stability over conﬂict in
hierarchical social groups. If the calculated costs of com-
peting for status outweigh the beneﬁts, then followership
would be a rational choice that would free time and energy
for other pursuits (Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). Perhaps
to become leaders themselves someday, followers need to
defer to leaders to observe how they lead (Henrich &
Gil-White, 2001). Coordination beneﬁts are also negotia-
ble, and followers can improve their relative beneﬁts if they
engage in collective bargaining (Boehm, 1993, 1999).
There is a ﬁnal intriguing possibility. Although the
payoffs for followers may be less than those for leaders,
coordination leads to higher aggregate-level payoffs (in
Table 1, an aggregate of 4 points vs. 0 points). Thus,
groups with an effective leader–follower structure would
have higher aggregate ﬁtness. Under the right conditions
(discussed in Sober & Wilson, 1998; D. S. Wilson, Van
Vugt, & O’Gorman, 2008), leadership might create enough
variation between groups for natural selection to operate. It
is possible that well-led groups are so much better at group
hunting, food sharing, and warfare that the relatively lower
within-group payoffs for followers are compensated for by
between-groups ﬁtness beneﬁts. That is, followers may not
be as well off as their leaders, but they are better off than
individuals in poorly led groups.
3 The interplay between
individual- and group-level selection pressures yields po-
tentially interesting implications for leadership. Multilevel
selection models have provided novel insights into such
social traits as culture and morality (Haidt, 2006, 2007;
D. S. Wilson et al., 2008).
A Natural History of Leadership
In this section, we present a hypothetical description of
how leadership practices evolved over the course of non-
human to human primate history. Such scenarios always
risk being just-so stories because their key assumptions are
difﬁcult to verify. Nonetheless, clues embedded in the
relevant literatures can be used to estimate the time frame
and structure of social organizations that promoted changes
in leadership practices in human societies. We identify four
nominal stages (summarized in Table 2).
Stage 1: Prehuman Leadership
The phylogenetic evidence suggests that preadaptations for
leadership precede primates. Simple leader–follower struc-
tures for coordinating group movement have been observed
in various social species (Bloom, 2000; Boinski & Garber,
2000; Couzin et al., 2005; E. O. Wilson, 1975). For exam-
ple, the waggle dance of honeybees recruits other hive
members to visit food resources and can be construed as
leadership. The foraging patterns of many insects, the
swimming patterns of schools of ﬁsh, and the ﬂying pat-
terns of migrating birds also resemble leader–follower re-
1 Yet, the greater the asymmetry in payoffs, the longer it takes to
establish coordination (Van Vugt & Kurzban, 2007).
2 Arvey and colleagues have conducted twin studies and estimate that
about a third of the variance in holding a professional leadership job is due
to genetic factors, which provides partial support for frequency-dependent
selection (Arvey, Rotundo, Johnson, Zhang, & McGue, 2006; Arvey,
Zhang, Avolio, & Kreuger, 2007).
3 Evolutionary models demonstrate that leadership substantially in-
creases variability in outcomes between groups (Richerson & Boyd,
2006). For instance, technological innovation, education, and quality of
life are far greater for citizens in modern democracies than for those in
dictatorships, totalitarian regimes, and corrupt societies (Bloom, 1997;
Diamond, 1997; Lawrence & Nohria, 2002; Transparency International,
2005).
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complex cognitive capacities can display follower behavior
using a decision rule as simple as “follow the one who
moves ﬁrst.”
Group movement guided by leadership is also docu-
mented in nonhuman primates. Hamadryas baboons in
Ethiopia sleep in large groups on cliffs (Kummer, 1968).
They leave the cliffs in the morning to forage in open areas.
One individual, usually an adult male, will move a few
meters in a particular direction and sometimes the whole
group will follow. Sometimes, however, there are no fol-
lowers, and the would-be leader returns to the group. The
bidding starts again until the rest ﬁnally choose to follow
(Kummer, 1968). This reﬂects the two key decisions in the
leader game: the choice to initiate and the choice to follow.
Chimpanzees, our closest genetic relatives, often dis-
play peacekeeping, another response to a coordination
problem solved by leadership. The following incident from
the Arnhem Zoo chimpanzee colony was reported by de
Waal (1996):
A quarrel between Mama and Spin got out of hand and ended in
ﬁghting and biting. Numerous apes rushed up to the two warring
females and joined in the fray. A huge knot of ﬁghting, screaming
apes rolled around in the sand, until Luit [the alpha male] leapt in
and literally beat them apart. He did not choose sides in the
conﬂict . . . instead anyone who continued to act received a blow
from him. (p. 129)
De Waal (1996) argued that this peacekeeping behavior
constituted leadership because it was endorsed by the entire
group.
Leadership has also been observed during aggressive
encounters between groups of wild chimpanzees (Boehm,
1999; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). Boehm (1999) re-
ported a conﬂict between neighboring chimpanzee groups
in Gombe, Tanzania, who met on a borderland in the forest.
The alpha male from one group charged the other group
and the rest followed him, prompting the other group to
retreat into its home range.
These examples support the claim that adaptations for
leadership and followership tend to evolve in social spe-
cies. This does not necessarily explain why leadership
evolved in humans; different selection pressures shaped the
adaptation of different species, and humans have many
unique adaptations (Buss, 2005; Darwin, 1871). Nonethe-
less, the continuity of evidence across species makes it at
least plausible that the selection pressures that gave rise to
leadership in nonhumans resemble those in humans.
Stage 2: Band and Tribal Leadership
It is likely that leadership was further shaped by the unique
evolutionary history of humans. One can think about modal
patterns of human leadership as evolving through three
stages. Each stage represents a change in the scale and
complexity of social organization and resource distribution
that had implications for the relationship between leaders
and followers.
The ﬁrst (and by far the longest) phase extended from
the emergence of early humans around 2.5 million years
ago until the end of the last ice age, about 13,000 years ago
(Diamond, 1997; Wade, 2006). During this stage, the Pleis-
tocene era, humans lived in semi-nomadic hunter-gatherer
bands and clans consisting of 50–150 mostly genetically
related individuals (Dunbar, 2004). Experts agree that mod-
ern hunter-gatherers—for example, the !Kung San of the
Kalahari Desert, the Yanomamo of the Amazon River
basin, the Inuit of the Arctic coasts, and the Aborigines in
Northern Australia—provide our best model for human
social organization in this stage, often referred to as the
environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA; Bowlby,
1969; Foley, 1997). Extrapolating from hunter-gatherer
evidence, we can infer that living conditions in the EEA
were fundamentally egalitarian, with no formalized leader-
ship role. The best hunters and warriors, so-called Big
Men, exercise disproportionate inﬂuence on group decision
making, but their power is limited to their domain of
expertise and accumulated degree of trust (Boehm, 1999;
Table 2
A Natural History of Leadership
Stage Time period Society Group size
Leadership
structure Leader
Leader–follower
relations
1 2.5 million years
ago
Prehuman Any size Situational or
dominance
hierarchy
Any individual
or alpha
Democratic or
despotic
2 2.5 million to 13,000
years ago
Hominid bands,
clans, tribes
Dozens to
hundreds
Informal,
situational,
prestige
based
Big man, head
man
Egalitarian and
consensual
3 13,000 to 250 years
ago
Chiefdoms, kingdoms,
warlord societies
Thousands Formal,
centralized,
hereditary
Chiefs, kings,
warlords
Hierarchical and
unilateral
4 250 years ago to the
present
Nations, states,
businesses
Thousands
to millions
Structural,
centralized,
democratic
Heads of state,
managers,
executives
Hierarchical but
participatory
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how the Mae Enga in New Guinea make warfare decisions,
Meggitt (1977, p. 76) noted,
The men who initiated the conference, or their spokesmen, brieﬂy
indicate their view of the clan’s position and the action they favor.
They may argue that now is the time to launch a full-scale attack
on the neighboring clan with the aim of occupying a speciﬁc
section of its territory. The major Big Man [the leader] then
solicits responses from the audience. Ideally, everyone present
has a voice and being among his own clansmen can speak with
complete freedom. The task of the Big Man at this stage is to
ensure that all have a chance to offer their opinions and facts in
full and to make no attempt to cut off any but obviously irrelevant
speeches.
If the Big Men try to dominate their groups—and they
do—they meet ﬁerce resistance from the others, who can
collaborate to control them. Dominance hierarchies are the
norm in primate groups; for early humans, collaboration
among subordinates reversed this dominance hierarchy and
resulted in a democratic leadership style that may have
existed for nearly 2.5 million years (Boehm, 1993). We
believe that the EEA reﬂects our natural way of thinking
about and responding to leadership, and this has implica-
tions for modern leadership practice. Modern societies still
evaluate leadership against egalitarian “hunter-gatherer”
standards such as fairness, integrity, competence, good
judgment, generosity, humility, and concern for others, and
they regard such attributes as dominance and selﬁshness as
the antithesis of leadership (Den Hartog, House, Hanges,
Ruiz-Quintanilla, & Dorfman, 1999; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002;
Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Lord et al., 1984; Nicholson,
2005; Van Vugt, Hart, Jepson, & De Cremer, 2004).
Homo sapiens emerged roughly 200,000 years ago
(Dunbar, 2004); modern humans’ increased cognitive ca-
pacities supporting theory of mind, language, and culture
may have enabled bands to merge into larger tribal struc-
tures—likely in response to the pressure of intergroup
warfare (Alexander, 1987; Bloom, 1997; Chagnon, 1997;
Diamond, 1997; Keeley, 1996; Van Vugt et al., 2007;
Wade, 2006; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). The new hi-
erarchical authority structures were nonetheless inherently
democratic, despite more elaborate social structures and
larger groups (Boehm, 1999; Johnson & Earle, 2000; Rich-
erson & Boyd, 2006).
Stage 3: Chiefs, Kings, and Warlords
Our evolved leadership psychology may not have changed
fundamentally since the EEA, but our social structures
changed dramatically beginning with the development of
agriculture at the end of the last ice age some 13,000 years
ago. Agriculture and dependable food supplies enabled
groups to settle and populations to grow exponentially. For
the ﬁrst time in human history, communities accumulated
surplus resources, and leaders played a key role in their
redistribution (Diamond, 1997; Johnson & Earle, 2000). As
communities grew, so did the potential for within- and
between-groups conﬂict. Leaders acquired extra power to
deal with such threats, which resulted in more formalized
authority structures that paved the way for the ﬁrst chief-
doms and kingdoms (Betzig, 1993; Johnson & Earle,
2000). In their expanded role, leaders could siphon off
resources and use them to create groups of dedicated fol-
lowers, the cultural elite (Padilla, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2007),
and sometimes they established hereditary leadership. The
payoff for leaders increased substantially during this pe-
riod, attracting shrewd, resourceful individuals to these
positions for selﬁsh reasons that are reﬂected in these
leaders’ astonishing relative reproductive success (Betzig,
1993).
4 In contrast to hunter-gatherers, families in settled
communities found it difﬁcult to move away from or de-
fend themselves against these exploitative leaders.
The inevitability of intergroup conﬂict led to the rise
of warlords and soldier classes, tough, aggressive men who
built coalitions of followers united in the common purpose
of extracting resources by force. Warlord societies are the
norm in preindustrialized societies such as medieval France
(Johnson & Earle, 2000). A substantial proportion of mod-
ern humanity, including those living in parts of Asia and
much of Africa, the Middle East, and South America, still
live under these oppressive conditions (Transparency In-
ternational, 2005). When centralized governments break
down, warlords inevitably emerge (e.g., Iraq or Afghani-
stan). Warlords are leaders—they have followers whose
loyalty is predicated on the possibility of gaining resources,
privilege, and prestige in the new regime (Padilla et al.,
2007). Warlords use their power to dominate resources and
advance their personal interests, agendas that conﬂict with
our evolved leadership psychology.
Stage 4: State and Business Leadership
The fourth leadership period corresponds roughly to the
beginning of the Industrial Revolution some 250 years ago.
Communities merged into states and nations, and large
businesses developed, all of which had implications for
leadership practices. Citizens of states and employees in
organizations are relatively free from the predations of their
leaders and may defect to other states or organizations.
This freedom shifts the balance of power away from lead-
ers and produces conditions more akin, but not equivalent,
to the reverse dominance hierarchy of the EEA (Boehm,
1993). In the early stages of the Industrial Revolution,
however, and in developing economies today, workers
were almost slaves. Class warfare is real, but in the devel-
oped world it is moderated and its effects are muted com-
pared with the situation in parts of the world still dominated
by warlords (Transparency International, 2005). Modern
academic discussions of leadership almost exclusively con-
cern social arrangements in the industrialized world (Wiel-
kiewicz & Stelzner, 2005).
Although modern bureaucratic arrangements make
business sense, they may be constrained by our evolved
leadership psychology. Human beings are not fungible;
4 For example, population geneticists estimate that 8% of the men
living in southern Asia today are descended from the warlord Genghis
Khan (Xue et al., 2005; also reported in Wade, 2006).
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man nature than others. For example, large organizations
seem to perform better when organized in units roughly the
size of hunter-gatherer groups with minimal status distinc-
tions between superiors and subordinates (Nicholson,
2000). Leadership practice should consider these con-
straints.
Summary
Cognitive preadaptations for leadership—for example, so-
lutions to simple coordination problems—probably
evolved long before humans. Leadership became more
reﬁned during the EEA in response to challenges associated
with the growing size and complexity of groups and the
inevitability of conﬂict both within and between groups.
The development of cognitive capacities—notably lan-
guage, theory of mind, and culture—facilitated large-scale
leadership. Hunter-gatherer data suggest that leadership in
the EEA was consensual, democratic, and transitory. The
formalized leadership structures that emerged after the
agricultural revolution are novel and potentially conﬂict
with our evolved leadership psychology. The Industrial
Revolution helped free people from tyrannical warlords,
but the scale, complexity, and form of contemporary orga-
nizations pose novel challenges to our innate leadership
psychology.
Implications of an Evolutionary
Analysis for Leadership Theory and
Practice
In this ﬁnal section, we note implications of the foregoing
discussion for leadership theory, research, and practice.
Some of these implications can be derived from other
models of leadership, for example, psychodynamic or so-
cial exchange theories. Yet, any proximate theory of lead-
ership must ultimately turn to evolution to explain its own
assumptions (e.g., why people are driven by sexual in-
stincts or motivated by fair outcomes). Moreover, an evo-
lutionary framework seems to generate a wider variety of
implications than other theoretical perspectives, as well as
some unique implications.
Understanding Followership
The leadership literature overwhelmingly focuses on the
people in charge (cf. Hollander, 1992; Kaiser et al., 2008),
but an evolutionary view highlights the importance of
followership. The psychology of followership is more com-
plicated and interesting than that of leadership. First, most
people are followers, so there is, in principle, more to talk
about. Second, and more interesting, it is not obvious why
people agree to subordinate themselves when this may put
them at an evolutionary disadvantage (Dawkins, 1976). We
suggest that followership emerged in response to speciﬁc
ancestral problems that were best solved through collective
effort coordinated by a leader–follower structure that en-
hanced individual and group survival. This implies that
leader–follower patterns will emerge more quickly and
effectively in circumstances that mirror adaptive problems
(e.g., internal group conﬂict, external threats).
This hypothesis has not been tested explicitly; how-
ever, it is consistent with prior ﬁndings. People are more
likely to follow under conditions of threat—for example,
during natural disasters or intergroup conﬂicts (Baumeister,
Chesner, Senders, & Tice, 1989; Hamblin, 1958). Van
Vugt and De Cremer (1999) showed that leaderless groups
negotiate internal conﬂicts less effectively in times of cri-
ses. In the famous Robbers’ Cave experiment, when faced
with team competition, the two groups of schoolboys
promptly chose team leaders (Sherif, 1966). Followers also
prefer different leaders depending on the problem they
face. U.S. voters tend to choose hawkish presidents when
threatened by war (McCann, 1992) and to show an in-
creased preference for charismatic leaders and a decreased
preference for participative leaders when reminded of their
mortality (Cohen, Solomon, Maxﬁeld, Pyszczynski, &
Greenberg, 2004). Similarly, CEO charisma is positively
related to organizational effectiveness only under condi-
tions of environmental uncertainty (Waldman, Ramirez,
House, & Puranam, 2001).
Another implication of our analysis is that leadership
may be unnecessary and even resented when people face
relatively simple or routine coordination problems. This is
consistent with the literature on substitutes for leadership
(Kerr & Jermier, 1978) and self-managing teams (Morge-
son, 2005); exercising unneeded leadership can actually
undermine team performance (Haslam et al., 1998). Here
lies an important leadership lesson: Except for certain
well-deﬁned situations, people will perform better if they
are left alone.
The leadership literature could beneﬁt by the addition
of studies investigating follower motives in different situ-
ations, the personality correlates of good followers, and the
ways in which followers inﬂuence leaders (cf. Altemeyer,
1981; Hollander & Offermann, 1990; Wayne & Ferris,
1990). We predict that followership styles are at least as
variable and differentiated as leadership styles (cf. Bocci-
aletti, 1995). An evolutionary view of leadership empha-
sizes followership and is a promising perspective for theory
and research on followers.
Who Shall Lead?
Our analysis explains why certain individual differences
are consistently associated with leadership. The leader
game predicts that ﬁrst movers in coordination situations
are most likely to become leaders, and this prediction is
borne out in the literature. A recent meta-analysis indicated
that of the Big Five personality dimensions, extraversion is
the most highly related to leadership emergence and effec-
tiveness ratings (Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002).
Moreover, the ambition component of extraversion, rather
than the sociability component, accounts for this relation-
ship (cf. J. Hogan & Holland, 2003): Primary studies report
correlations between leadership and such narrower band
dimensions as assertiveness, boldness, initiative, need for
achievement, proactivity, and risk taking (e.g., Ames &
Flynn, 2007; Bass, 1990; House & Aditya, 1997), which all
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domain, people who quickly recognize that situations re-
quire coordination are more likely to become leaders. This
might explain the relationship between general intelligence
and leadership (Judge, Ilies, & Colbert, 2004) and why
intelligence is a universally desired characteristic of leaders
(Den Hartog et al., 1999; Lord et al., 1986). We expect that
as coordination tasks become more complex, cognitive
factors will become a better predictor of leadership (cf.
Jacques, 1989).
Our analysis also suggests that an ability to estimate
the payoffs for followers is necessary for leaders to be
inﬂuential. This would explain the empirical links between
leadership and social intelligence, political skill, empathy,
perspective taking, and nonverbal sensitivity (R. Hogan &
Hogan, 2002; Kellett, Humphrey, & Sleeth, 2002; Zaccaro,
Gilbert, Thor, & Mumford, 1991). Bass (1990) noted, “The
leader must be able to know what followers want, when
they want it, and what prevents them from getting what
they want” (p. 168). This also suggests that the more
complex the group, the more socially astute the leader
needs to be.
Another implication of our analysis is that good lead-
ers should be perceived as both competent and benevolent
because followers want leaders who can acquire resources
and then are willing to share them. The ﬁrst claim is
supported by research showing that task expertise corre-
lates with leadership (Bass, 1990) and that low expertise
disqualiﬁes individuals from leadership positions (Hol-
lander & Offermann, 1990). Leaders’ willingness to share
is reﬂected in such traits as trustworthiness, fairness, gen-
erosity, and self-sacriﬁce—universally desirable leader at-
tributes (Den Hartog et al., 1999; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002;
Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Lord
et al., 1984; Nicholson, 2005).
Finally, an evolutionary analysis explains why lead-
ership correlates with such factors as age, height, weight,
and health—something not explained by existing leader-
ship theory. Given the risks associated with following,
people should prefer leaders who can beneﬁt the group. In
ancestral environments, having specialized knowledge—
the location of waterholes during a drought, for instance—
may have been vital (Boehm, 1999). Older individuals are
more likely to have specialized knowledge, and age should
therefore be correlated with leadership. Group movement
in nomadic species—for example, baboons and ele-
phants—is often decided by the older, not the most domi-
nant, troop member (Dunbar, 2004). Today, age and lead-
ership are related in roles that require specialized
knowledge, for example, directors on governing boards of
public corporations (Gandossy & Sonnenfeld, 2004). When
group activities require strength and stamina (group de-
fense in ancestral times, grueling travel schedules in mod-
ern business), physical indices such as energy level and
health should correlate with leadership (D. P. Campbell,
2002; Nicholson, 2000; Van Vugt, 2006). Not surprisingly,
modern voters prefer physically ﬁt political candidates
(Simonton, 1994). It is interesting that seemingly irrelevant
physical factors like height predict leadership status today
(Judge & Cable, 2004). In ancestral times, taller leaders
may have been more effective peacekeepers within groups
and more intimidating foes to rival groups.
Situational Accounts of Leadership
Our evolutionary model provides deeper insight into situ-
ational theories of leadership. Although there are individual
differences in leadership propensity (Ilies, Gerhardt, & Le;
2004; Judge et al., 2002), distributed leadership was prob-
ably advantageous in ancestral environments (e.g., the best
hunter leads the hunting party, the wisest elder resolves
internal conﬂicts, the ﬁercest warrior leads the ﬁght; see
Boehm, 1999). This suggests that leadership and follower-
ship are ﬂexible strategies elicited by the interaction be-
tween certain evolved decision rules and speciﬁc environ-
mental inputs (cf. Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). Consider
the distinction between task- and people-oriented leader-
ship (Bass, 1990; Yukl, 2006). Our model suggests that
task leadership emerges when the interests of leaders and
followers converge, for example, when both parties prefer
Waterhole A and the decision is how to get there. People-
oriented leadership should emerge when interests diverge
and leaders must persuade people to follow them. This
logic provides an explanation for proximate models of
leadership such as Fiedler’s (1967) contingency theory and
House’s (1971) path-goal theory.
Vroom’s prescriptive model of when to apply auto-
cratic (hierarchical) versus more participative (egalitarian)
decision-making styles (Vroom & Jago, 1978) can be sim-
ilarly understood. In emergencies, the interests of leaders
and followers converge, and followers readily defer to the
decisions of a single individual (Guetzkow & Simon, 1955;
Keegan, 1994). However, when the interests of leaders and
followers diverge, leaders must encourage participation to
ensure acceptance of the decision. Consequently, leader-
ship styles can vary somewhat between organizations, na-
tions, and cultures depending on the speciﬁc challenges of
their physical and social environments (Hofstede, 1980;
Van De Vliert, 2006), and these differences can be trans-
mitted culturally from one generation to the next (Richer-
son & Boyd, 2006). Participative styles prevail in the
Netherlands and Australia, where harsh natural conditions
forced authorities to share power with citizens, creating a
strong egalitarian ethos (cf. Den Hartog et al., 1999). Econ-
omists have recently used game theory to model the origins
of modern democracy versus dictatorship and reached es-
sentially the same conclusion: Democracies emerge when
authorities must make concessions to avoid losing power
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006).
The Role of Dominance
Our analysis suggests that there are two forms of group
hierarchies. The ﬁrst is the dominance hierarchy that results
from competition for scarce resources, in which the stron-
gest and most determined individual prevails and controls
group resources and activities (Schjelderup-Ebbe, 1935;
E. O. Wilson, 1975). The second form of hierarchy
emerges by consensus when hierarchical structures are
perceived to beneﬁt the group. These two forms offer very
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characterizes species in which alpha males control group
activities and others are intimidated or forced to acquiesce.
However, human hierarchies are much ﬂatter and often
based on prestige rather than dominance (Henrich & Gil-
White, 2001). The emergence of prestige-based hierarchies
was pivotal and probably increased our capacity to function
in highly coordinated units.
Nonetheless, dominance is part of our primate heri-
tage, and there is always a risk that leaders will try to
coerce followers (Betzig, 1993; Boehm, 1993; Padilla et
al., 2007). This makes leader–follower relations inherently
ambivalent. There are at least two forces reinforcing this
ambivalence. First, many with leadership aspirations do not
become leaders (R. Hogan, 2006, chap. 5). Accession to
leadership is a Darwinian process; through a series of
events inﬂuenced by circumstances and luck, one person
prevails. The losers join the ranks of the followers and
scheme to gain power in the future. Second, dominance
facilitates leadership functions such as enforcing rules
within the group and presenting a formidable opposition to
enemies during warfare. Yet dominant leaders can also
bully their own group for personal gain; obviously, follow-
ers do not want to be exploited and must ﬁnd ways to
protect their interests. Anthropological data show that in
most societies, people ﬁercely resist domination and often
band together to curb the power of their leaders (Boehm,
1993).
This tension probably created an evolutionary “arms
race” between the strategies of leaders and followers to
gain control. The ethnographic and psychological litera-
tures reveal several decision rules that leaders use to in-
crease power. For instance, leaders can redistribute re-
sources fairly and generously—this is a universally desired
leadership attribute (Brown, 1991; Den Hartog et al., 1999;
Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Leaders
can use an external group threat to consolidate their power
(Cohen et al., 2004; Padilla et al., 2007). Leaders can also
“buy” support through bribery—some followers will col-
lude with authoritarian leaders if the price is right (Alte-
meyer, 1981; Padilla et al., 2007). Nepotism and cronyism
are also common strategies for retaining power in humans
(Gandossy & Sonnenfeld, 2004) and chimpanzees (de
Waal, 1982). Finally, leaders can impose ideologies to
justify their privileged position. Throughout history, lead-
ers have used religion to maintain power—for example, the
“divine” right of kings—and turned their rule into a hered-
itary position to beneﬁt their offspring (Betzig, 1993; Di-
amond, 1997; Johnson & Earle, 2000).
Various decision rules may have evolved to enable
individuals to beneﬁt from followership without being ex-
ploited by leaders. Boehm (1993, 1999) described several
such “leveling mechanisms.” One is to accept leadership
only in areas where leaders have expertise. A second mech-
anism is to use gossip, ridicule, elections, and other forms
of public scrutiny to control leaders. In hunter-gatherer
bands, if a chief misbehaves, he is publicly criticized, and
if he tries to give commands, he is often rebuffed (Freeman,
1970, cited in Boehm, 1999). Overbearing leaders can also
simply be disobeyed. Freeman (1970, cited in Boehm,
1999) reported that followers ignore Philippine chiefs who
issue commands rather than suggestions. Disobedience is
effective because leaders are sanctioned without being re-
placed, which could disrupt and weaken the group. Reluc-
tant followers can also ostracize exploitative leaders. Os-
tracism usually has severe consequences for the ostracized
(Bloom, 1997; Williams & Sommer, 1997). Moore (1972,
cited in Boehm, 1999) reported that when an aggressive
tribal leader starts a feud without group support, the other
tribesmen can declare him no longer one of their own and
allow rival groups to kill him with impunity. Followers can
also desert despotic leaders. Van Vugt et al. (2004) found
that attrition rates were four times greater in autocratically
led groups than in democratically led groups. Finally, fol-
lowers can overthrow or even kill an overbearing leader.
These leveling mechanisms are critical for the welfare of
followers and groups. Historical evidence suggests that
tyrants and dictators emerge whenever followers are unable
to protect themselves against exploitative leaders (Betzig,
1993; Padilla et al., 2007).
The Mismatch Hypothesis
Climate surveys routinely show that 60%–70% of employ-
ees in most organizations report that the most stressful
aspect of their jobs is their immediate boss (R. Hogan,
2006, chap. 6). Further, the failure rate of managers in
corporate America is 50% (R. Hogan & Kaiser, 2005).
These ﬁndings raise the possibility that there may be a
mismatch between the evolved leadership psychology of
humans and the practice of leadership in the modern world
(Van Vugt, Johnson, Kaiser, & O’Gorman, in press).
5 Our
leadership psychology evolved over two million plus years,
during which time people lived in small, kin-based egali-
tarian bands in which leadership was informal, consensual,
and situational. This psychology may still affect the way
we respond to leaders. The challenge for modern organi-
zations is either to work with or work around the limita-
tions of this psychology.
Situational versus structural leadership.
Leadership in the ancestral environment was ﬂuid, distrib-
uted, and situational. The individual most qualiﬁed for the
task at hand had the greatest inﬂuence on collective actions.
Rarely would one individual coordinate all group activity
and make all group decisions. However, with bureaucracy
and formal leadership roles, one individual—the leader—is
responsible for managing all these functions (Weber,
1947). Accordingly, leadership versatility—the ability to
perform multiple, even competing, leadership roles—is
highly associated with executive effectiveness (Kaiser,
Lindberg, & Craig, 2007; Kaplan & Kaiser, 2006). How-
ever, few leaders have the range of skills needed to perform
a wide array of such duties (Kaiser & Kaplan, 2007;
5 Mismatch is an evolution-informed concept that refers to the fact
that traits that were adaptive in ancestral environments might no longer
produce adaptive behaviors in modern environments, especially when
these environments dramatically differ, as is the case with those of modern
humans.
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high failure rate of senior managers. It may also explain
recent interest in the notion of distributed leadership—the
idea that leadership is a process that can be shared (Gronn,
2002; Pearce & Conger, 2003).
Relative power. Boehm’s (1993, 1999) concept
of the reverse dominance hierarchy suggests that the power
of ancestral leaders derived from legitimization from fol-
lowers (cf. Hollander, 1992). In modern industrial and
bureaucratic organizations, however, leaders are appointed
by and accountable to managers senior to them in the
organizational hierarchy, and subordinates have little
power to sanction their bosses. Modern organizational eth-
nographers report that most managers implicitly understand
that pleasing superiors is more important to career success
than is pleasing subordinates (Sayles, 1993). This may be
one source of the alienation and disengagement felt by
today’s workforce. It is noteworthy that executives are
more likely to succeed if subordinates are included in the
selection process (Sessa, Kaiser, Taylor, & Campbell,
1998).
In the EEA, there were minimal status distinctions
between leaders and followers (Boehm, 1999; Nicholson,
2005). However, in modern American corporations, aver-
age salaries for CEOs are 179 times the average pay for
workers (“Business Bigwigs,” 2007). Research shows that
power increases the potential for abuse (Kipnis, 1972) and
decreases the ability to empathize with subordinates (Ga-
linski, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006). The highly asym-
metric payoffs for modern business leaders may encourage
a kind of leadership that followers naturally resent.
Small, homogeneous groups versus large,
heterogeneous groups. The small hunter-gatherer
societies of our ancestral past were essentially extended
families. Members knew each other, understood their in-
terdependencies, and had a genetic investment in one an-
other’s fate (Dunbar, 2004; Hamilton, 1963). These groups
were held together by kinship and norms of reciprocity and
fairness, which require that individuals depend on others
for cooperation and return the favor in kind (Trivers, 1971).
Leaders played a role in enforcing these norms by punish-
ing cheaters and free riders. The need for such leadership
activities is probably greater today, when organizational
members are unrelated and the size of corporations makes
identiﬁcation with the group difﬁcult. It is interesting that
social identity research indicates that transformational lead-
ership works by inﬂuencing followers to identify with the
group and to internalize group aspirations (Shamir, House,
& Arthur, 1993; Van Knippenberg, Van Knippenberg, De
Cremer, & Hogg, 2004; Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999).
Transformational leaders change the way followers see
themselves—from self-interested individuals to members
of a larger group, almost as if they are kin—by modeling
collective commitment, emphasizing the similarity of
group members, and reinforcing collective goals, shared
values, and common interests. However, transformational
leaders are the exception, not the rule, in the modern world
(Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978).
Modern citizens may feel more alienated and discon-
nected from their employers and other social organizations
since the Industrial Revolution (Durkheim, 1897). Arendt
(1951) suggested that these feelings of alienation promote
apathy and make followers feel powerless to inﬂuence
social institutions, including leadership. Arendt further ar-
gued that the alienation and indifference felt by citizens
paved the way for the totalitarian regimes that swept into
power in Germany, Russia, and Italy in the early 20th
century.
Effective organizations such as Toyota, GoreTex, and
Virgin are designed and structured in a way that resembles
hunter-gatherer bands. For instance, these companies del-
egate decision making to managers far down the chain of
command so that the size of functional units approximates
that of a hunter-gatherer band (50–150 individuals; Dun-
bar, 2004; Nicholson, 2000). In addition, decentralized
forms of organizing are associated with greater employee
morale, involvement, and commitment (Likert, 1967),
which in turn are associated with greater productivity,
ﬁnancial results, and customer satisfaction (Harter,
Schmidt, & Hayes, 2002).
Leadership prototypes. The ancestral envi-
ronment may have shaped our leadership prototypes (Lord
et al., 1984) so that we have a natural preference for
persons who match these implicitly desired characteristics.
Evolved prototypes can be inferred from characteristics
that are both prominent among hunter-gatherer Big Men
and endorsed across industrial societies. We have already
discussed the importance of certain physiological traits
such as height. Strong candidates for psychological leader
traits include integrity—good leaders are trustworthy; per-
sistence—good leaders are models of steadiness in the face
of adversity; humility—good leaders are modest and put
the good of the group ahead of personal ambitions; com-
petence—good leaders are resources for their groups; de-
cisiveness—good leaders make timely and defensible de-
cisions, especially under trying conditions; and ﬁnally,
vision—good leaders are inspiring (Den Hartog et al.,
1999; Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Hogan & Kaiser, 2005;
Lord et al., 1984; Nicholson, 2005). It is striking to note
how so-called “derailed” executives—bright, ambitious,
and talented managers who nonetheless fail—are often
described as lacking these very characteristics (cf. Bentz,
1985; McCall & Lombardo, 1983).
Another apparent prototype may provide clues to a
controversial modern social issue, that of leadership and
gender. Male leadership was the norm in ancestral envi-
ronments—although there has always been a niche for
female peacekeepers among primates (de Waal, 1996) and
humans (Van Vugt, 2008)—and male leadership continues
to be the norm today (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Heilman,
2001; Schein, 1973). It remains to be seen how beneﬁcial
the male leadership bias is in a global economy that em-
phasizes interpersonal skills and network building (Eagly
& Carli, 2003). There is evidence that women have better
empathy and communication skills than men (Van Vugt,
2006) and that women are more likely to adopt a demo-
cratic leadership style (Eagly & Johnson, 1990). Nonethe-
less, the male bias may be difﬁcult to overcome. Research
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group tasks, the men are quicker to claim leadership
roles—even when the women are better qualiﬁed (Mezulis,
Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004). An intergroup threat
automatically activates a preference for male leadership
(Little, Burriss, Jones, & Roberts, 2007; Van Vugt, 2008).
Regardless of talent, men are also more likely to assume
leadership roles when being observed by women, perhaps
because women prefer status in potential mates (Buss,
2005; Jensen-Campbell, Graziano, & West, 1995). Women
are also penalized for excelling at stereotypically masculine
tasks such as leadership (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Heilman,
2001). Finally, there is consistent but subtle bias in the way
executives—including those who espouse diversity—eval-
uate women leaders (Lyons & McArthur, 2007). It is pos-
sible that the “glass ceiling” is a vestige of our ancestral
past that requires more than sociostructural and policy-
level solutions.
Conclusion
Leadership is a crucial but often misunderstood topic.
Much of the misunderstanding comes from the tendency to
think about leadership only in terms of the people in charge
(R. Hogan et al., 1994; Kaiser et al., 2008). In this article
we have analyzed leadership from an evolutionary perspec-
tive and suggested three conclusions that are not part of the
conventional wisdom. The ﬁrst is that leadership cannot be
studied apart from followership and that an adequate ac-
count of the leadership process must consider the psychol-
ogy of followers. Second, the goals of leaders and follow-
ers do not always converge, a fact that creates a
fundamental ambivalence in the relationship between lead-
ers and followers. Third, 2.5 million years of living in small
egalitarian communities shaped the way we respond to
leadership today. We are often required to defer to people
in leadership roles whose behavior is markedly inconsistent
with qualities important in ancestral leadership. This may
lead to frustration, alienation, and efforts to change leaders,
jobs, or careers. If we want to know why leadership some-
times fails in modern society, we should consult the lessons
from our past.
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